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EVALUATING LEGISLATIVE JUSTICE SECTOR REFORMS: 
CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR SURVIVAL 
Lauren A. Shumate† 
INTRODUCTION 
The famous adage “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done,” is as applicable in legal systems around the world 
today as it was over eighty years ago when Lord Chief Justice Hewart first 
introduced it in the landmark English case Rex v. Sussex Justices.1 In recent 
decades, countries around the globe have engaged in rule of law and judicial reform 
initiatives.2 As Thomas Carothers suggests, it is impossible to engage in foreign 
policy debate without the rule of law being offered as the solution to the world’s 
problems.3 The notion of the rule of law is a powerful political ideal in 
contemporary global discourse and “[e]veryone, it seems, is for the rule of law.”4 
Multi-million dollar democratization projects across the globe have shaped many 
legislative justice sector reform initiatives to help strengthen the rule of law, 
establish judicial independence, and promote democratic principles around the 
world.5 Furthermore, aid and development programs have focused specifically on 
judicial independence due to the positive relationship between economic growth 
and countries with an independent judiciary.6 
Such reform efforts have been most prominent in transitional democracies and 
in post-conflict and post-communist countries. Eastern Europe has been one of the 
most fertile regions for rule of law reform with concentrated efforts to “de-
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 1.  Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923). 
 2.  Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth, Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in 
Comparative Perspective, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 345, 346 (2009). 
 3.  Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN 
SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 3 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
 4.  Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 232, 232 
(2012). 
 5.  Id. at 232; see also Helmke & Rosenbluth, supra note 2, at 346 (indicating that international and 
economic organizations such as the World Bank are using their financial power to facilitate judicial reform in 
developing countries, citing statistics that link the rule of law to economic growth). 
 6.  Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining de facto Judicial Independence, 27 INT’L REV. L & ECON 
271 (2007) (finding that GDP growth per captita is positively related to de facto judicial independence). 
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Sovietize” and reform their legal systems.7 However, rule of law initiatives have 
not been limited to Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries. Other regions that 
continue to be involved in rule of law reform include Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East, and Latin America.8 These comprehensive law and development 
reform efforts have included the rewriting of constitutions, drafting of new codes or 
statutes, reforming of government institutions, providing for legal education, and 
training of legal personnel.9 Regrettably, these efforts have proven to be slow and 
challenging, yielding results that are often indecisive or outright ineffective.10 
Nevertheless, the rule of law continues to be pursued as a universal political ideal 
because of its widespread appeal.11 Unfortunately, conceptual definitions of judicial 
independence and the rule of law remain elusive and contested.12 Failures in 
conceptualization, whereby judicial independence is included in measures of the 
rule of law, has led to the inability to effectively analyze the relationship between 
the two and has undermined the necessity of an independent judiciary for the 
effective establishment of rule of law legislation in transitioning countries. 
Furthermore, the lack of supportive legal, social, and political cultures in 
transitioning countries has also hampered legislative justice sector reforms. 
This Note argues that judicial independence, particularly de facto judicial 
independence, is a strong indicator of the rule of law and an important part of the 
broader legal culture needed to support legislative rule of law reform. Additionally, 
this Note argues that the type of legal system and characteristics of the political 
regime in power are also important in establishing an environment conducive to 
supporting a reformed rule of law. Part I of this Note will review definitions of the 
rule of law and judicial independence, including how both concepts have been 
defined for legislative reform purposes and will address some of the challenges 
facing global reform initiatives. Part II presents a quantitative analysis that 
examines the effect of judicial independence on the establishment of the rule of law 
and analyzes whether the type of political regime and legal system a country 
possesses also affects the rule of law. These results are then applied to the case of 
Serbia in Part III. In particular, this Note examines the legislative justice sector 
reforms currently underway in Serbia and examines how a lack of de facto judicial 
independence has hindered legislative reforms. Part IV argues for a less theoretical 
and more practical approach to judicial independence based on a de facto measure; 
this will more accurately reflect the level of judicial independence and thereby lead 
to a more accurate depiction of its effect on the rule of law. Furthermore, a more 
thorough conceptual understanding of judicial independence and the rule of law and 
 
 7.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 8. 
 8.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 3; see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures 
of Law and Development, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 209, 217-18 (2011). 
 9.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 8. 
 10.  Tamanaha, supra note 8, at 217. 
 11.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1, 3-4 (2004). 
 12.  Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 232; Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and its 
Implications for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 231 (2010); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, et. al., The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1458, 1464 (2010) (suggesting the rule 
of law is a contested concept); Lydia Brashear Tiede, Positive Political Theory and the Law: Judicial 
Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 129-30 (2006) (stating 
that a consistent and concrete definition of “judicial independence” is elusive). 
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the relationship between the two will better equip policy makers to more effectively 
implement legislation to shore up the rule of law in transitional countries. This Note 
concludes by suggesting that, in addition to establishing de facto judicial 
independence to help ensure success of legislative reforms designed to strengthen 
the rule of law, greater efforts should be made to cultivate a legal, social, and 
political culture that is more willing to accept and support legislative justice sector 
reforms.13 
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, THE RULE OF LAW, AND LEGISLATIVE 
JUSTICE SECTOR REFORMS 
Despite the fact that concepts of judicial independence and the rule of law 
continue to be contested among political and legal scholars, popular wisdom and 
belief in the international community suggests that an independent judiciary is the 
cornerstone of a democratic, market-based society based on the rule of law.14 The 
concept of judicial independence and the rule of law is a “venerable part of Western 
political philosophy” seen as a “rising imperative during the era of globalization.”15 
However, while judicial independence makes sense on paper, aid providers and 
legal scholars have found that merely enacting new laws does not bring about the 
intended results without changing the process of implementation and 
enforcement.16 Nevertheless, research suggests a close relationship between the rule 
of law and human rights, and it stresses the importance of an independent judiciary 
in securing human rights17 and the rule of law.18 Over time, elements such as the 
separation of powers and judicial review, along with many other legal and 
democratic concepts have been borrowed from the American legal system and 
“transplanted” into numerous legal systems around the world.19 
 
 13.  This research is by no means comprehensive, nor does it deal with all of the conflicting theoretical 
arguments and complexities surrounding democracy, political culture, judicial independence, and the rule of 
law. It is merely intended to further the understanding of the relationship between judicial independence and 
the rule of law and demonstrate the need to go beyond mere legislative reforms on paper. 
 14.  Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common Law as a Proxy for the Global Ambition of 
Law and Economics, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J, 929-30 (2007) (citing USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, 
Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality 6 (Jan. 2006)). 
 15.  Carothers, supra note 3. 
 16.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 11-12 (stating that major judicial reform efforts have foundered on the 
assumption that external aid can substitute for the will to reform). 
 17.  Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection Around the World, 85 
JUDICATURE 195 (2002). 
 18.  See Lydia Brashear Tiede, Judicial Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood, 15 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 129, 129 (2006) (stating “[j]udicial independence is frequently touted as the lynchpin of a 
democratic society and the rule of law.”); Roberto Laver, The World Bank and Judicial Reform: Overcoming 
“Blind Spots” in the Approach to Judicial Independence, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 183, 183 (2012) 
(asserting “an independent judiciary is fundamental to the rule of law.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, et. al., supra 
note 12, at 1461; Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial 
Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422, 422-23 (2003). 
 19.  Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1-2 (2004). 
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A. Judicial Independence 
A close cousin to rule of law development has been judicial reform, which like 
the rule of law, has gained widespread support. Judicial independence has enjoyed 
nearly universal consensus as to its normative value as an institutional mechanism 
to protect and uphold the rule of law, along with its importance in the effective 
operation of constitutional democracy;20 it has been cited as the “lynchpin of a 
democratic society and the rule of law.”21 The United Nations has endorsed the 
importance of an independent judiciary requiring each member state to guarantee 
the independence of its judiciary in its constitutions or laws.22 Furthermore, the 
European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the critical role of judicial 
independence by enshrining it in Article 6 of the Convention, which guarantees the 
right to be heard by an independent tribunal.23 
Membership in many international organizations, along with respect in the 
international community, has helped to encourage widespread legislative justice 
sector reform initiatives. International and economic organizations, such as the 
World Bank, are using their financial power to facilitate judicial reform in 
developing countries.24 In addition, sought-after membership in the European 
Union has provided major incentive to implement rule of law reforms, with one of 
its entrance criteria being an independent and impartial judiciary. Moreover, 
multimillion-dollar democratization projects across the globe, including large 
financial contributions from the United States, have played a significant role in 
shaping a wide range of judicial reform initiatives.25 As a result of such widespread 
support and belief in the inherent values of judicial independence and the rule of 
law, global legislative reform efforts have primarily been focused on the justice 
sector. 
However, the importance of judicial independence to the rule of law has led to 
judicial independence being included in definitions of the rule of law.26 Judicial 
independence is also often considered a component of the rule of law and is 
frequently included in measures of the rule of law.27 This Note argues that such 
 
 20.  Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual 
Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 607, 625 (1996). 
 21.  Tiede, supra note 18, at 129. 
 22.  U.N. DEP’T of INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE 
PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, at 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 121/22/Rev.1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.86.IV.1 (Annex: U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary) (1985) [hereinafter 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary]. 
 23.  European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Sept. 3, 1953 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also USAID, 
GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY, 5-6 (2002) (agreeing with the 
prevailing view of the court’s role in protecting individual rights, stating that judicial independence 
contributes to the enforcement of contracts and private property rights, the reduction of corruption, and the 
protection of civil and political rights, and it provides restraints on arbitrary government action). 
 24.  Helmke & Rosenbluth, supra note 2, at 346. 
 25.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 4. 
 26.  Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 12, at 231 (submitting that a universal definition of the rule of law must 
incorporate an independent judiciary to apply the law to specific cases). 
 27.  See Freedom in the World 2015 Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE (2015), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology_FIW_2015.pdf (measure of civil liberties includes 
“rule of law” indicator which incorporates a measure of judicial independence); THE WORLD JUSTICE 
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conceptualization and operationalization of judicial independence is flawed. That is, 
judicial independence is not synonymous with the rule of law, nor can it be defined 
by the rule of law. Problems of conceptualizing judicial independence and the rule 
of law have led to heated debates over the proper definition and measurement of 
each, which has resulted in further difficulties in formulating and implementing 
effective justice sector reform legislation. Specifically, this Note argues that judicial 
independence, and in particular de facto judicial independence, is an important 
piece of the legal and political cultural fabric necessary for legislative rule of law 
reforms to be successful. 
Defining Judicial Independence: De jure and De facto Conceptualization 
Despite many efforts to define judicial independence, it has remained a difficult 
concept to measure in reality and has often resulted in a country’s judiciary being 
evaluated according to its legal status and establishment in a country’s constitution. 
In its most general sense, judicial independence requires a neutral judge to make 
fair and impartial decisions, free from outside pressure or coercion.28 In addition, 
the judiciary as a whole must be independent and separate from the government and 
other concentrations of power.29 Judicial independence centers on the notion of 
conflict resolution by a neutral third party. This is important for two reasons. First, 
it is essential for justice to prevail. A neutral judge will allow all individuals equal 
treatment before the law and safeguard the protection of their rights. Second, 
independence of the judiciary is critical when the government is a party to the case 
to ensure that judges will not be biased in favor of the government. As such, judges 
must be protected from threats, interference, and manipulation that may cause them 
to unjustly favor the state. While it is important that an independent judiciary is 
guaranteed and established in the supreme law of a country, it is equally important 
that its independence does not only exist on paper, but is also carried out in 
practice. Unfortunately, too often the reliance on formal indicators of judicial 
independence does not match reality––it is not representative of the way in which 
the judiciary behaves in practice.30 Studies have indicated the need to go beyond 
analyzing and assessing formal judicial independence in order to determine the 
actual level of judicial independence based on the behavior of the judiciary in 
practice.31 
Definitions of judicial independence have included a number of elements 
including that an independent judiciary decides matters in accordance with the law; 
it equally and impartially enforces the constitution; it upholds political and civil 
 
PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 4 (2012); INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE, METHODOLOGY (2012) 
(“law and order” component includes a measurement of judicial independence); Emily J. Barton, Pricing 
Judicial Independence: An Empirical Study of Post-1997 Court of Final Appeal Decisions in Hong Kong, 43 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 361, 364 (2002) (testing the “strength of the perceived relationship between rule of law 
(measured by judicial independence) and the strength of financial markets”). 
 28.  Justice F.B. William Kelly, Vancouver: International Centre for Criminal Justice Reform and 
Criminal Justice Policy, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE CORE OF THE RULE OF LAW 1, 6 (1996). 
 29.  Id. at 6. 
 30.  Larkins, supra note 20, at 615. 
 31.  Camp-Keith, supra note 17, at 199; see also Robert M. Howard & Henry F. Carey, Is an 
Independent Judiciary Nescessary for Democracy?, 87 JUDICATURE 284, 285-86 (2004). 
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rights; it can expect its decisions to be implemented and not impeded by other 
branches of the government; and it is free to make decisions without fear of 
retribution from other branches of government or political entities.32 Once 
conceptualized, it is important to distinguish between two types of judicial 
independence–– de jure judicial independence and de facto judicial independence. 
De jure judicial independence is derived from the letter of the law, and it focuses on 
the legal foundations of judicial independence taking into account the method of 
nominating and/or appointing judges, term lengths, possibility of reappointment, 
and so forth.33 On the other hand, de facto judicial independence is defined as the 
actual independence enjoyed by judges, and it focuses on the factually ascertainable 
degree of judicial independence.34 De facto judicial independence accounts for 
variables such as effective average term lengths, the number of times judges have 
been removed from office, judges’ salaries, and whether the decisions of the highest 
court are dependent upon some other branch or body of government in order to be 
implemented.35 
Research suggests that many countries that have high levels of de jure judicial 
independence have low levels of de facto judicial independence.36 This finding and 
distinction between de jure and de facto judicial independence suggests that while it 
is important and necessary to establish de jure judicial independence, it is by no 
means sufficient to merely enshrine judicial independence within the context of 
legal documents. Judicial independence must go “beyond mere de jure provisions 
that seemingly protect judicial independence in a democratic and constitutionally 
responsible manner.”37 Furthermore, although countries may have a constitutionally 
established judiciary, the lack of independence in practice can lead to significantly 
lower levels of political and civil rights for citizens, which results in a decrease in 
respect for human rights.38 Therefore, this Note argues that it is essential that 
judicial independence be established not only on paper, but also in practice in order 
for legislative justice sector reforms to be successful. 
B. The Rule of Law 
The rule of law is a concept that has garnered near universal appeal and support 
and has become “perhaps the most powerful and often repeated political ideal in 
contemporary global discourse.”39 The widespread acceptance and appeal of rule of 
law reform is reflected in the countless projects and statements of powerful 
influential U.S. and international public and private agencies.40 These institutions 
 
 32.  Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, Judicious Choices: Designing Courts in Post-
Communist Politics, 33 COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES, 163, 165-67 (2000); see also Larkins, 
supra note 20, at 608; Hayo & Voigt, supra note 6, at 278-280. 
 33.  Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence 
Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 501 (2003). 
 34.  Id. at 498. 
 35.  Feld & Voigt, supra note 33, at 503-4. 
 36.  Feld & Voigt, supra note 33, at 505. 
 37.  Howard & Carey, supra note 31, at 286. 
 38.  Id. at 290. 
 39.  Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 232. 
 40.  Tamanaha, supra note 8, at 217 (including the World Bank, the United States Agency for 
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fund and help carry out law and development reforms. Legislative justice sector 
reform efforts have included drafting constitutions and codes, implementing 
judicial reforms, transplanting laws and institutions, enhancing legal education and 
training, and combating corruption.41 
Increasingly, the rule of law has become an important principle and doctrine in 
state building, and it has been viewed as necessary in order for “failed states” to 
successfully transition from conflict to durable peace.42 This is likely because of the 
profound relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy.43 The rule of 
law promotes individual rights, which are at the core of liberal democracy.44 
Liberalism represents a particular approach to government, which emphasizes a 
commitment to the rule of law, individual rights, and representative government 
with limitations on the powers of the state.45 Reformers and scholars insist that the 
“rule of law is an unalloyed good, promoting and safeguarding values that are 
intrinsically desirable, such as economic development and social progress . . . [and 
is] essential to a justice-seeking polity.”46 Thus, despite theoretical controversy as 
to whether democracy is the best form of government, current practice in the global 
community suggests that liberalism is closely connected with rule of law reform 
initiatives. 
Conceptualizing the Rule of Law: Thick versus Thin Definitions 
The phrase “rule of law” has become a popular one in international and 
domestic politics, but its meaning has remained elusive. Aristotle stated more than 
two thousand years ago that “[t]he rule of law is preferable to that of any 
individual.”47 It is a system in which the laws are public knowledge, they are clear 
in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.48 Such a system upholds the political 
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the past 
several decades.49 The United Nations has attempted to establish a common rule of 
law definition designed to guide the work of various agencies and programs within 
the United Nations. According to the United Nations, the rule of law is said to be a 
principle of governance whereby all individuals, including the state, are equally 
subjected and accountable to the law, which is equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and includes measures to ensure the separation of powers, participation 
 
International Development (USAID), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the UN Development 
Program (UNDP), and the American Bar Association (ABA)). 
 41.  Tamanaha, supra note 8, at 217; see also Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 1460. 
 42.  See generally Richard Sannerholm, Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict 
Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 65 (2007). 
 43.  See Carothers, supra note 3, at 4 (indicating that democracy includes institutions and processes that 
are rooted in a particular legal system). 
 44.  See Carothers, supra note 3, at 4. 
 45.  See SCOTT BURCHILL, Liberalism, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 57, 58-62 (4th ed., 
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 2009) (indicating the influence of liberalism and its emphasis on the rule of law). 
 46.  Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 1456. 
 47. ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS, BOOK III 16 (1286). 
 48.  Carothers, supra note 3, at 4. 
 49.  Id. 
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in decision-making, and procedural and legal transparency.50 
The contested definitions of the rule of law can largely be classified as either 
“thick” (substantive) or “thin” (formal). Brian Tamanaha attempts to define this 
classification by systematically distinguishing between formal and substantive 
definitions of the rule of law. Within each category, he constructs a continuum 
between “thin” and “thick” definitions. According to Tamanaha, 
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the 
law was promulgated; the clarity of the ensuing norm; and the temporal 
dimension of the enacted norm. . .Formal conceptions of the rule of law 
do not seek to pass judgment upon the actual content of the law itself. 
Those who espouse substantive definitions go beyond this. They accept 
that the rule of law has the formal attributes mentioned above. . .but 
certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the 
rule of law.51 
Thus, thin definitions are more formalistic and akin to “rule by law” without 
any emphasis on content. These definitions see the rule of law as an instrument of 
government action wherein people are ruled by it.52 In other words, thin rule of law 
may not actually be the rule of good laws. Joseph Raz emphasizes this point by 
opining that the rule of law should not be confused with democracy, justice, 
equality, or human rights. According to Raz “the rule of law” means literally what it 
says: the rule of the law, where taken in its broadest sense, means people should 
obey the law and be ruled by it.53 Thus, Raz states that: 
A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on 
poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities. . .may in principle, 
conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal 
systems of the more enlightened Western democracies. . .This does not 
mean that the nondemocratic system will be better. . .It will be an 
immeasurably worse legal system, but it may excel in one respect: in its 
conformity to the rule of law.54 
However, even with his literal stance regarding the meaning of the rule of law, 
Raz acknowledges some of the overlap between law and morality and the moral 
virtue of the rule of law. This appears to recognize that the rule of law is more than 
adherence to formal rules. If the rule of law is to minimize the danger of law itself, 
this seems to suggest that the rule of law should protect against the type of 
repressive, authoritarian system described above.  Consequently, Raz may not be on 
the very extreme rule by law end of the continuum, but he nonetheless advocates a 
 
 50.  U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
 51.  TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 91-2. 
 52.  JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (Robert L. 
Cunningham ed., Texas A&M University Press 1979). 
 53.  Id. at 5. 
 54.  Id. at 4. 
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“thinner” definition of the rule of law. 
In contrast, thick rule of law definitions are more substantive with greater 
emphasis placed on the content of the rules or laws themselves. As a result, a thick 
definition of the rule of law requires that the law comply with substantive ideals, 
including liberal and/or social human rights.55 According to Thom Ringer, a thick 
view of the rule of law necessarily comprises certain universal moral principles or 
virtues, inherently liberal in character, and related to freedom.56 Brian Tamanaha 
characterizes this thick view as a substantive view that includes individual rights 
within the rule of law, and draws on Ronald Dworkin’s “rights conception” stating 
that: 
[t]he rule of law on this conception is the ideal rule. . .it assumes that 
citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and 
political rights against the state as a whole. . .It requires, as a part of the 
ideal of law, that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce moral 
rights.57 
The research presented in this Note relies on a thick, or substantive, definition 
of the rule of law. This is primarily because it is this conception that has gained 
force and recognition with international organizations and institutions and foreign 
aid donors that seek to promote and fund rule of law reform initiatives in post-
conflict and newly democratic states because of the rule of law’s close connection 
to human rights. This conceptualization is also often that which is utilized in global 
indices measuring the strength of the rule of law.58 
C. Failed Attempts of Legislative Justice Sector Reforms 
Despite the universal appeal of rule of law and judicial reform, law and 
development efforts have encountered significant challenges and have ended up 
with disappointing results.59 Law and development initiatives have generally taken 
the form of transplanting Western legal institutions and codes into developing 
countries, but these efforts have been generally viewed as failed attempts.60 Such 
efforts have failed for a number of reasons. However, most significant have been 
the lack of a supportive legal culture and the lack of an independent judiciary 
actually operating independently and impartially in practice.61 
There is limited empirical evidence that focuses specifically on the relationship 
 
 55.  Svend-Erik Skanning, Measuring the Rule of Law, 63 POL. SCI. RES. Q. 449, 451 (2010). 
 56.  Thom Ringer, Development Reform, and the Rule of the Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common 
Understanding of the ‘Rule of Law’ and its Place in Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 178, 190 (2007). 
 57.  TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 102. 
 58.  This Note does not attempt to argue which theoretical conception of the rule of law is better, but 
rather it attempts to adopt a conceptual definition that is consistent with those used in justice sector reform 
initiatives. 
 59.  See Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 209; John C. Reitz, Politics, Executive Dominance and 
Transformative Law, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 743, 745-46 (2008). 
 60.  Tamanaha, supra note 8, at 211.. 
 61.  Id. at 211, 222-23. 
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between judicial independence and the rule of law, and there is debate as to whether 
an independent judiciary guarantees the establishment of the rule of law.62 
Specifically, skepticism exists regarding the relationship between the rule of law 
and judicial independence and whether the rule of law requires judicial 
independence.63 An additional problem is that in many cases, judicial independence 
is included in the definition and measurement of the rule of law. Disagreement over 
conceptual definitions of judicial independence has hidden its true value and 
importance to the rule of law. This has significantly undermined legislative justice 
sector reforms and contributed to failed law and development efforts in 
transitioning countries. Specifically, the lack of de facto judicial independence has 
resulted in many of the legal legislative reforms, such as constitution and code 
drafting simply failing to take hold. This Note argues that legislative justice sector 
reforms have primarily failed because of a lack of de facto judicial independence. 
This lack of judicial independence in practice has resulted in the failure to uphold 
newly drafted constitutions and legal codes that are part of the broader rule of law 
reform effort. However, it is also argued here that such legislative rule of law 
reforms have failed in transitioning states because they lack an environment 
conducive to the survival of the newly drafted laws, constitutions, and policies. De 
facto judicial independence makes up a part of that environment along with the type 
of legal system and characteristics of the political regime in power. 
II. COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. Method and Data 
This Note uses OLS multiple regression analysis to analyze the effect of three 
independent variables (legal system, type of political regime, and judicial 
independence) on one dependent variable (the rule of law) using data available from 
2007 through 2012. This data is comprised of a set of indicators of judicial 
independence and the rule of law covering fifty-one countries. The results 
demonstrate the strong relationship between judicial independence and the rule of 
law. Specifically, the results show the high importance of de facto judicial 
independence in establishing and strengthening the rule of law. Therefore, the 
results support the argument that justice sector reforms must do more than merely 
enact legislative changes on paper. Rather, in order to be successful, justice sector 
reforms must also be established in practice. 
B. Variables 
1. Dependent Variable: Rule of Law 
When testing the effect of judicial independence on the rule of law, the 
dependent variable is the rule of law, which is represented as an index score 
 
 62.  Helmke & Rosenbluth, supra note 2, at 346-47. 
 63.  Micah B. Rankin, Access to Justice and the Institutional Limits of Independent Courts, 30 WINDSOR 
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 101, 131 (2012). 
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between zero and one, with low values denoting a weaker rule of law and high 
values indicating a strong rule of law. As previously stated, rule of law definitions 
vary between “thick,” or substantive definitions and “thin,” or formal definitions. 
This Note relies on a “thick,” or substantive definition of the rule of law, as this 
conception is that which has gained force and recognition with international 
organizations and institutions along with foreign aid donors that seek to promote 
and fund rule of law reform initiatives in post-conflict and newly democratic states. 
Therefore, the rule of law here is conceptualized to mean that people obey and 
respect the law and are ruled by it, while the government, which respects its 
citizens’ individual political rights and civil liberties, is also ruled by the law and 
subjected to it. 
To measure the rule of law this Note relies on the Rule of Law Index 
constructed by the World Justice Project (WJP).64 The WJP defines the rule of law 
as a 
rules-based system in which four universal principles are upheld: 1) the 
government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; 2) 
the laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental 
human rights, including security of persons and property; 3) the process 
by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, 
fair, and efficient; and 4) justice is delivered timely by competent, 
ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of 
sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the 
communities they serve.65 
Because this Note seeks to analyze the relationship between judicial 
independence and the rule of law, it is important that the measures of these 
variables do not overlap. A factor designed to measure the level of judicial 
 
 64.  See ARAST, M., BOTERO, J., PONCE, A., & PRATT, C., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WJP RULE OF 
LAW INDEX 2 (2012-13). The WJP Rule of Law Index is derived from a set of principles that represent a 
working definition of the rule of law and is intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of the extent to 
which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. It covers a total of ninety-seven countries and is 
measured according to nine factors that are further broken down into forty-eight sub-factors. The index scores 
are constructed from over four hundred variables that are drawn from the collection of two original sources of 
data: a General Population Poll (GPP) conducted by leading local polling agencies using a representative 
sample of one thousand respondents in three cities per country; and a series of Qualified Respondents’ 
Questionnaires (QRQ) which consists of closed-ended questions and is completed by country experts, 
practitioners, and scholars who have qualified expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal justice, labor 
law, and public health. To conceptualize the rule of law, the WJP constructs a working definition according to 
a set of principles that were derived from international standards and norms as well as national constitutions. 
The WJP attempts to balance its definition between thin and thick conceptions of the rule of law by 
incorporating both substantive and procedural elements. Nevertheless, their definition can be said to be more 
on the thick, or substantive side of the rule of law continuum with its incorporation of factors that capture the 
extent to which a country respects core human rights. 
 65.  Id. at 2, 9, 12. The eight factors that capture the measurement of the four principles listed above 
include: limited government powers; absence of corruption; order and security; fundamental rights; open 
government; regulatory enforcement; civil justice; and criminal justice. The final scores and rankings were 
constructed based upon codifying questionnaire items into numeric values and producing raw country scores 
by aggregating the responses from several individuals (experts or general public). The raw scores were then 
normalized and aggregated into sub-factors and factors using simple averages and the final rankings and 
scores were produced using the normalized scores. 
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independence cannot be included in the measurement of the overall rule of law 
score, and vice versa. The WJP Rule of Law Index includes several factors that are 
related to the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, it was necessary to subtract 
these factors out and recalculate the rule of law index score for each country in the 
analysis.66 The final result was eight factors designed to provide a comprehensive 
measure of the rule of law that together were further broken down into a total of 
forty sub-factors. This was then recalculated providing for an overall rule of law 
index score for each country in the analysis.67 
2. Independent Variable: Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence is an independent variable in the study, which is 
represented as an index score between zero and one, with low values being 
associated with low levels of judicial independence and high values being 
associated with high levels of judicial independence. The Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary, as outlined by the United Nations, defines judicial 
independence to be the duty of all governmental institutions to respect and observe 
the independence of the judiciary, and that this independence is guaranteed by the 
supreme law of the country.68 Additional definitions have included that an 
independent judiciary decides matters in accordance with the law and justice; it 
equally and impartially enforces the constitution; it upholds political and civil 
rights; it can expect its decisions to be implemented and not impeded by other 
branches of the government; and it is free to make decisions without fear of 
retribution from other branches of government or political entities.69 Lars Feld and 
Stephan Voigt devised a measure of judicial independence to measure such factors 
by analyzing the judiciary as established by law in the country and also how it 
operates in practice.70 
Judicial independence is conceptualized here as the impartial resolution of 
conflict by a neutral third party and the extent to which a judiciary is free to exert 
its own judgment without fear of retribution; all governmental institutions and 
branches respect this freedom; and it is guaranteed by the supreme law of the 
country. To measure judicial independence, this Note relies on the dataset 
developed by Feld and Voigt that gauge judicial independence according to a set of 
two indicators––de jure judicial independence and de facto judicial independence. 
De jure judicial independence is defined to be that which is established by law and 
 
 66.  When recalculating scores for the rule of law index, the same method of calculation as outlined by 
the WJP was followed. Once the necessary sub-factors were removed, the scores for each of the eight factors 
were recalculated by adding the sub-factor scores contained within each factor together and dividing by the 
number of sub-factors to obtain a new aggregated score for each factor. The eight factor scores were then 
added together and divided by eight to produce a new rule of law index score between zero and one for each 
country. 
 67.  These countries were cross-referenced with those for which both de facto and de jure judicial 
independence scores were available. Countries were eliminated that were not included in the dataset for 
judicial independence. 
 68.  Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 22, at 60. 
 69.  Ishiyama & Smithey, supra note 32, at 165-167; see also Larkins, supra note 20, at 608; Hayo & 
Voigt, supra note 6, at 278-280. 
 70.  See Feld & Voigt, supra note 33. 
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de facto judicial independence is defined to be that which is actually adhered to and 
carried out in practice.71 
The de jure judicial independence indicator is based on the legal foundation as 
found in legal documents of a country and is comprised of twenty-three 
characteristics that are grouped into twelve variables. Each of the variables is given 
a value between zero and one, with higher values indicating a higher level of 
judicial independence while lower values are associated with a lower level of 
judicial independence.72 The de facto indicator focuses on the extent to which 
judicial independence is factually implemented and uses eight variables that are 
also assigned a value between zero and one with higher values indicative of higher 
levels of judicial independence.73 This Note derives an overall judicial 
independence score for each of the fifty-one countries by adding the de jure and de 
facto scores together and dividing it by two (assuming equal weight for both 
indicators) and obtaining a value between zero and one.74 Data for the de jure 
indicator was available for seventy-five countries, while data for the de facto 
indicator was only obtainable for sixty-six countries.75 
3. Independent Variable: Political Regime 
Although the extent to which democracy plays a role in the establishment of an 
independent judiciary is highly contested, a significant portion of research indicates 
that independent judiciaries are more likely to be found in democratic societies.76 
The development of international legal organizations and institutions that support 
 
 71.  Id. at 501, 503. 
 72.  Id. at 501-503. Because information was not available for all twelve indicators, the sum of the coded 
variables that were available were divided by the total number of variables, resulting in an overall de jure 
score between zero and one. The twelve variables that make up the de jure indicator include whether the 
highest court is established in the constitution; the level of difficulty in amending the constitution; the 
appointment procedure of judges; judicial tenure; the determination of judicial salary; adequate compensation; 
the ability to remove judges from office with the exception of doing so by legal procedure; whether judicial 
terms are renewable; accessibility of the court and ability to initiate proceedings; the allocation of cases; the 
presence of judicial review; and whether court decisions are published and available to the public. 
 73.  Id. at 504. In order to ensure some level of accuracy, only countries that had at least three variables 
for de facto independence available were scored and ranked. The 8 factors making up the de facto indicator 
include the effective average term length; whether a judge was removed before the end of term; influence of a 
judge dependent upon the number of judges on the court; whether judicial incomes remained constant in real 
terms; development of the court’s budget; changes in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court; 
and whether decisions of the highest court are dependent upon some other branch or body of government in 
order to be implemented. 
 74.  Because one of the arguments in this Note centers on the proposition that a de facto measure of 
judicial independence is a better indicator of the actual level of independence, and thus a better predictor of 
the rule of law, both the overall judicial independence score constructed using the Feld and Voigt indicators is 
used along with the de jure and de factor scores being used as individual scores when testing the effects of 
judicial independence on the rule of law. 
 75.  Id. at 504. Countries were only included in the dataset if  they contained a minimum of three 
variables for the de facto indicator, which explains the unequal and relatively low number of countries in the 
dataset. Due to the unequal numbers between the set of indicators, the countries were cross-referenced to 
ensure the same countries were represented in both datasets. Countries that appeared in one of the indicators 
but not the other were dropped from the dataset. 
 76.  Ishiyama & Smithey, supra note 32, at 164; see also Douglas M. Gibler & Kirk A. Randazzo, 
Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding, 55 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 696, 696-709 (2011); Phillips, supra note 14, at 929. 
182 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:1] 
and advocate democratic principles and human rights, along with the further 
development of international law and widespread democratization initiatives 
appears to largely be due to the influence of liberalism and its emphasis on the 
importance of global standards and the rule of law.77 Despite weaknesses and 
limitations in explaining the relationship between states, current practices of many 
post-conflict countries suggest that liberal democratic theory seems to be the basic 
justification for the numerous reform initiatives taking place that promote 
democratic principles, including the rule of law, judicial independence, and human 
rights. 
Therefore, this Note contends that a democratic system provides a political 
culture more conducive to legislative rule of law reform efforts. As such, the second 
independent variable is the type of political regime, which is defined as the system 
of government that is in power. For the purposes of this study, the type of political 
regime is classified as either democracy or non-democracy. The “governing 
authority” factor of the Polity IV dataset is used, which ranges from “fully 
institutionalized autocracies” through “mixed authority regimes” to “fully 
institutionalized democracies” to determine a country’s controlling political 
regime.78 For this analysis, countries that score in the range of a democracy are 
coded one and all others (those classified as either anocracies or autocracies) are 
classified as non-democracy and are coded zero. 
4. Independent Variable: Legal System 
As a result of the global initiative to reform and firmly establish the rule of law, 
the civil law approach has increasingly come under attack, facing criticisms of 
lacking transparency, being inefficient, unaccountable, and unable to protect the 
individual rights of citizens.79 In addition to widespread movement for countries 
based on a civil law tradition to adopt elements and borrow concepts from the 
common law system, nations are increasingly looking specifically to the American 
adversarial model.80 In contrast to the civil law system, the common law approach 
has been upheld as being both transparent and accountable. It has been seen to offer 
a better opportunity for establishing an independent and impartial judiciary, which 
has been viewed as a core element of the rule of law and essential to providing the 
necessary foundation for economic growth.81 This is not to say that common law is 
better than or superior to civil law or any other type of legal system for that matter. 
Rather, this Note argues that a common law system will produce an environment 
better suited for the success of rule of legislative law reforms—in  this case, a 
 
 77.  BURCHILL, supra note 45, at 58-62. 
 78.  MONTY G. JAGGERS & BENJAMINE R. COLE, CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE – POLITY IV PROJECT , 
STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND MATRIX 2012 (2012). This categorization is based upon a twenty-one-point 
scale that ranges from (-10) hereditary monarchy to (+10) consolidated democracy, and is divided into three 
categories: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to +10). The Polity IV dataset 
covers all major independent countries with a population of five hundred thousand or greater in the most 
recent year over the period of 1800-2010, and it measures regime characteristics and change. 
 79.  Phillips, supra note 14, at 916. 
 80.  Phillips, supra note 14, at 916; see also Langer, supra note 19, at 1, 5. 
 81.  Phillips, supra note 14, at 919. 
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substantive conception of the rule of law including protection for basic human 
rights. 
Therefore, the last independent variable is the type of legal system, which is 
conceptualized as the legal tradition upon which a country bases its laws. This 
information was obtained from the CIA World Fact Book.82 A country’s legal 
system is ranked on the basis of the type of legal tradition in place in the country. 
Based on research that suggests that the common law legal tradition provides a 
better environment for the rule of law to prevail,83 this study gives common law the 
highest ranking and goes downward from there. However, it is difficult today to 
find a legal system that is purely common law or civil law, and thus it becomes 
necessary to account for this when coding and/or ranking the legal systems of 
various countries. Thus, the legal systems are coded in the following manner: a 
purely common law system is coded “1;” civil/common law mixed is coded “2;” a 
purely civil law system is coded “3;” and a mixed system of civil/common law 
mixed with customary/Islamic/religious/traditional law is coded “4.” 
5. Control Variables 
In all models the analysis controls for political violence and armed conflict, 
political characteristics of the regime in power, and the number of years since the 
constitution was last amended. Although GDP has been correlated with both the 
rule of law and judicial independence, GDP in fact has been shown to be a result of 
judicial independence84 and the rule of law.85 In other words, economic 
development is dependent upon the existence of a strong rule of law and a de facto 
independent judiciary to ensure the application of such rules and law. Therefore, it 
would not be appropriate to control for this variable as a potential cause of judicial 
independence or the rule of law. 
Research suggests that military crises in a country can lead to the rejection of 
democratic institutions and principles, and thus could affect results obtained for 
judicial independence and the rule of law.86 Furthermore, it is expected that an 
unstable country with frequent regime changes and armed conflict will result in a 
 
 82.  The World Fact Book, WASHINGTON, DC: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html#xx. Information on a country’s 
legal system includes information regarding systems based on civil law (including French law, the Napoleonic 
Code, Roman law, Roman-Dutch law, and Spanish law); common law (including British and United States 
common law); customary law (legal systems where laws are seldom written down, they embody an organized 
set of rules regulating social relations, and they are agreed upon by members of the community); religious law 
(stemming from the sacred texts of religious traditions and, in most cases, professes to cover all aspects of life 
as a seamless part of devotional obligations to a transcendent, imminent, or deep philosophical reality); and 
mixed law (consists of elements of some or all of the other main types of legal systems–civil, common, 
customary, and religious). 
 83.  See Phillips, supra note 14, at 929-30. 
 84.  Feld & Voigt, supra note 33, at 497, 516 (finding that de facto judicial independence does positively 
influence real GDP growth per capita). 
 85.  Phillips, supra note 14, at 915, 928 (asserting that the rule of law leads to economic development 
growth). 
 86.  Gibler & Randazzo, supra note 76, at 699; see also Michael C. Desch, War and Strong States, Peace 
and Weak States?, 50 INT’L ORG. 237 (1996); William R. Thompson, Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart 
before the Horse?, 50 INT’L ORG. 141 (1996). 
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weaker and less developed rule of law. This is controlled for by using the “Security 
Effectiveness” score from the Center for Systemic Peace – State Fragility Index 
(SFI).87  In addition to stability and armed conflict being linked to levels of judicial 
independence and the rule of law, research also suggests that political regime 
characteristics are linked to democratic principles, which in turn can affect the 
strength of the rule of law in a particular country. Democracies and their inherent 
characteristics make them a more peaceful form of government because they 
ascribe importance to respect for law and value liberty, humanity, and welfare 
above power.88 To account for this, the State Fragility Index Political Legitimacy 
score is used, which measures regime-governance inclusion.89 It is anticipated that 
countries that have authoritarian characteristics, or lower political legitimacy 
scores, will be more likely to have low levels of judicial independence and rule of 
law, thereby limiting the effectiveness of legislative reforms adopted on paper. 
C. Results 
Since the dependent variable used in this study is measured at the interval level, 
OLS multiple regression is employed to analyze the models in the study. Table 1 
reports the means and frequencies of the independent and dependent variables, in 
addition to how each is measured in the model. Table 2 is the correlation matrix for 
the independent and dependent variables included in the analysis. 
Table 1: Variable Information 
 
Variables Measurement Mean Frequency % 
JI-overall Continuous between 0 and 1 .610 0-.199=2% 
.2-.399=11.8% 
.4-.599=25.5% 
.6-.799=45.1% 
.8-.999=15.7% 
JI-de jure Continuous between 0 and 1 .686 0-.199=0% 
.2-.399=3.9% 
.4-.599=21.6% 
.6-.799=49% 
.8-.999=25.5% 
JI-de facto Continuous between 0 and 1 .552 0-.199=9.8% 
.2-.399=11.8% 
 
 87.  JAGGERS & COLE, supra note 78, at 8. The Security Effectiveness score represents total residual war 
and provides a measure of general security and vulnerability to political violence, including armed conflict 
episodes. The score is calculated according to three indicators: the sum of annual scores for all wars in which 
the country is directly involved for each continuous period of armed conflict; interim years of “no war” 
between periods of armed conflict; and years of peace, or no war, since the end of the most recent war period. 
The final value is converted to a four-point fragility scale. 
 88.  Joe D. Hagan, Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness, 38 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 183, 
185 (1994). 
 89.  JAGGERS & COLE, supra note 78, at 8-9. The five indicators used to determine this score include: 
factionalism; ethnic group political discrimination against 5% or more of the population; political salience of 
elite ethnicity; polity fragmentation; and exclusionary ideology of ruling elite. The final score is calculated by 
adding together these five indicators. 
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.4-.599=39.2% 
.6-.799=17.6% 
.8-.999=21.6% 
Rule of Law Continuous between 0 and 1 .611 0-.199=0% 
.2-.399=7.8% 
.4-.599=43.1% 
.6-.799=35.3% 
.8-.999=13.7% 
Legal System 1=Common Law 
2=Common/Civil Law 
3=Civil Law 
4= Civil Law /Common Law-Mixed with Customary /
Islamic /Religious /Traditional 
3.18 1=5.9% 
2=2% 
3=60.8% 
4=31.4% 
Political Regime 0=Non-Democracy 
1=Democracy 
.82 0=17.6% 
1=82.4% 
Constitution Amendment Number of years from last constitutional amendment/
revision to 2012 
7.12 0-10=82.4% 
11-21=7.8% 
22-32=3.9% 
33-43=2% 
44-54-2% 
55-65=2% 
SFI Security Effectiveness Total residual war score converted to 4-point fragility 
scale 0=0; 1=0.1=15; 2=15.1-100; 3=greater than 100 
.51 0=72.5% 
1=7.8% 
2=15.7% 
3=3.9% 
SFI Political Legitimacy  Regime/Governance inclusion calculated by adding 5 
indicators. Scale 0-3 
.94 0=45.1% 
1=21.6 
2=27.5% 
3=5.9% 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix with r and p values for indicators of the rule of law, 
judicial independence (overall), and judicial independence (de facto) 
 
 JI Overall JI de facto Rule of Law 
JI Overall 1 
 
 .272 
(.053) 
JI de facto   1 
 
.415 
(.002)** 
JI de jure  -.269 
(.056) 
.021 
(.882) 
Legal System .140 
(.328) 
.415 
(.002)** 
-.321 
(.021)* 
Political Regime .274 
(.052) 
-.127 
(.374) 
.389 
(.005)** 
Constitution Amendment .126 
(.377) 
.403 
(.003)** 
.253 
(.073) 
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SFI Security Effectiveness  .122 
(.394) 
.225 
(.113) 
.532 
(.000)*** 
SFI Political Legitimacy  -.027 
(.852) 
-.122 
(.392) 
-.444 
(.001)** 
p values are indicated in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
The first model analyzed the effect of judicial independence expressed as an 
overall score (combining de facto and de jure measures), type of legal system, and 
type of political regime on the rule of law. The model controlled for the number of 
years since the constitution was amended, security effectiveness, and political 
legitimacy. The results of the OLS multiple regression analysis are reported in 
Table 3. Overall, the regression was significant with results of the ANOVA 
significant at less than .001, F (6,44) = 12.093, p < .05.90 Of the predictors 
investigated, four of them were significant, namely judicial independence, type of 
legal system, security effectiveness, and political legitimacy. Judicial independence 
was significant (b = .202, t = 2.298, p < .05) and exhibited a positive relationship 
with the rule of law. This suggests higher levels of judicial independence result in 
an increase in the rule of law. 
Table 3: Regression coefficients with t and p values for effects of judicial 
independence on the rule of law 
Model I. 
Model b Beta t Sig. 
Constant .631  7.402 .000*** 
Judicial Independence .202 .227 2.298 .026* 
Legal System -.042 -.216 -2.274 .028* 
Political Regime .074 .195 1.945 .058 n.s. 
Constitution Amendment  .001 .114 1.191 .240 n.s. 
SFI Security Effectiveness Score -.080 -.496 -5.245 .000*** 
SFI Political Legitimacy -.041 -.277 -2.819 .007** 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; n.s.=not significant 
The type of legal system was also significant (b = -.042, t = -2.274, p < .05).91  
The negative relationship observed between the type of legal system and the rule of 
law suggests that systems that are based upon the common law legal tradition are 
more likely to have a strongly established rule of law. Although the type of political 
regime was not statistically significant, it may still be affecting the strength of the 
rule of law (b = .074, t = 1.945, p > .05).92 It deserves mention that this factor 
 
 90.  The adjusted R-square (.571) demonstrates that the variables judicial independence, type of legal 
system, type of political regime, number of years since constitution was amended, security effectiveness, and 
political legitimacy accounted for fifty-seven percent of the variance in the rule of law. The standard error of 
the estimate value was .0952. The results showed no issues of multicollinearity, with tolerance levels for all 
predictors ranging between .853 and .958 and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was less than two for each 
predictor in the model. 
 91.  Recall that the type of legal system was measured by ranking a country’s legal system one through 
four, with a value of one being a purely common law legal system and most likely to provide an environment 
conducive to the rule of law, and four being a mixed system of civil/common/traditional/religious/customary 
law and being the least likely to produce an environment that would support the rule of law. If the number 
increases with respect to the type of legal system, or in other words moves further away from common law, 
the strength of the rule of law will decline. 
 92.  The p-value for this predictor at .058 was just over what was required for statistical significance. 
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comes close to being statistically significant and exhibits a positive relationship 
with the rule of law. This could suggest that countries that are democratic would be 
more likely to have a strongly established rule of law versus those that are non-
democratic. 
Both control variables, security effectiveness (b = -.080, t = -.5.245, p < .05) 
and political legitimacy (b = -.041, t = -2.819, p <.05), are highly significant.  
Security effectiveness measured political violence and armed conflict with higher 
scores representative of higher involvement with conflict. The negative relationship 
between security effectiveness and the rule of law suggests that higher levels of 
conflict result in a weaker rule of law. Similarly, political legitimacy also had a 
negative relationship with the rule of law. This suggests that a more repressive 
government is more likely to be associated with a weaker rule of law. The 
remaining control variable representing the number of years from when the 
constitution was amended to 2012 was not significant (b = .001, t = .1.191, p > .05). 
The regression equation for the effect of judicial independence on the rule of law is: 
Rule of Law = .631+.202(JI overall)-.042(legal system)-.080(security 
effectiveness)-.041(political legitimacy) 
When analyzing the effects of judicial independence on the rule of law in the 
second model, judicial independence was split into de facto and de jure scores. This 
is in contrast to the first model where judicial independence was represented as an 
overall score combing measures of de facto and de jure independence together. All 
other variables in the model remain the same as in Model I. OLS multiple 
regression analysis is used to analyze the effect of de facto and de jure judicial 
independence on the rule of law. The results of this model are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4: Regression coefficients with t and p values for effects of de facto and 
de jure judicial independence on the rule of law 
Model II. 
Model b Beta t Sig. 
Constant .670  6.424 .000*** 
Judicial Independence – de jure -.003 -.003 -.030 .976 
Judicial Independence – de facto .181 .284 2.661 .011* 
Legal System -.043 -.217 -2.276 .028* 
Political Regime .057 .152 1.476 .147 n.s 
Constitution Amendment  .001 .088 .910 .368 n.s. 
SFI Security Effectiveness -.077 -.479 -5.013 .000*** 
SFI Political Legitimacy -.039 -.265 -2.737 .009** 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; n.s.=not significant 
Overall, the regression was significant with results of the ANOVA significant 
at less than .001, F (7,43) = 10.967, p < .05.93 Of the predictors investigated, four of 
 
This result could be in part due to the small “n” of only fifty-one countries in the analysis. 
 93.  The adjusted R-square (.583) demonstrates that the variables de facto judicial independence, de jure 
judicial independence, type of legal system, type of political regime, number of years from when the 
constitution was amended to 2012, security effectiveness, and political legitimacy accounted for fifty-eight 
percent of the variance in the rule of law. The standard error of the estimate had a value of .0939. The model 
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all predictors ranging between .735 and .919 and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was less than two for 
each predictor in the model. 
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them were significant, namely de facto judicial independence, type of legal system, 
security effectiveness, and political legitimacy. The most notable change in this 
model is that de jure judicial independence is not significant (b = -.003, t = -.030, p 
> .05), while de facto judicial independence is highly significant (b = .181, t = 
2.661, p < .05). This suggests that de jure independence is not a significant 
predictor of the rule of law. This substantiates the claim that a constitutionally 
established judiciary does not guarantee the independence of the judiciary in 
practice and does not necessarily lead to a strongly established rule of law. By 
contrast, de facto judicial independence appears to be a very strong predictor of the 
rule of law and exhibits a positive relationship with the rule of law. 
The type of political regime was still not significant (b = .152, t = 1.476, p > 
.05). The type of legal system (b = -.043, t = -2.276, p < .05), security effectiveness 
(b = -.077, t = -5.013, p < .05), and political legitimacy (b = -.039, t = -2.737, p < 
.05) mostly remained the same and were still significant. Additionally, each of these 
three variables still had a negative relationship with the rule of law. The number of 
years from when the constitution was amended to 2012 was not significant (b = 
.001, t = .910, p > .05). The regression equation for the effect of de jure and de 
facto judicial independence on the rule of law is: 
Rule of law = .670+.181(JI de facto)+.043(legal system)-.077(security 
effectiveness)-.039(political legitimacy) 
There are shortcomings in the analysis based on the fact that only fifty-one 
countries are used. Namely, there are not an equal number of countries from the 
various regions around the world. Some areas such as countries in the Middle East 
and Africa are underrepresented in the study. However, there is substantial variance 
among the fifty-one countries that are included in terms of the type of political 
regime and legal system and also the level of judicial independence and strength of 
the rule of law. Additionally, although not all regions are represented equally, each 
region of the world is included. 
III. LEGISLATIVE JUSTICE SECTOR REFORMS IN SERBIA: CURRENT STATUS AND 
CHALLENGES 
Eastern Europe has been fertile ground for introducing legislative rule of law 
and justice sector reforms in its effort to move away from communist rule. Serbia is 
a snapshot specific example of the judicial and rule of law reforms that are 
occurring both in Eastern Europe and around the world today. The case study of 
Serbia provides an example of the global effort to reform the rule of law and 
establish an independent judiciary and demonstrates the need to enshrine judicial 
independence not only within the content of legal documents but also in practice 
and implementation. Specifically, Serbia is used as an example to demonstrate that 
it is possible to establish an independent judiciary in a written constitution, but this 
does not ensure the judiciary will operate independently in practice. Additionally, 
recent laws passed in Serbia regarding the justice sector have yet to fully take hold. 
It is argued here that this is, in part, because of a lacking supportive legal and 
political culture. This again demonstrates that laws merely enacted on paper are not 
effective without a proper environment that is receptive to their adoption. 
Serbia comes from a highly complex and complicated background that involves 
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a history of conflict, communism, and contested rule. Since the end of Milosevic’s 
regime, Serbia has sought to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and 
enhance its role in advancing legal and judicial reforms. Serbia is currently sitting at 
the crossroads of two distinct frameworks, and is in the relatively early stages of 
implementing recently launched rule of law and judicial reform initiatives. 
Although Serbia has made significant strides towards establishing an independent 
democratic nation based on the rule of law and also in the development of the 
justice sector, the integrity of the justice system itself remains inadequate. Despite 
substantial institutional changes, along with amendments to the national legal 
framework, high levels of corruption exist within the justice and law enforcement 
systems, and the quality of services provided within the justice system remains low. 
The lack of success of new rule of law and justice sector legislation can be linked to 
the existence of a weak de facto independent judiciary, which is a small but 
important piece in the broader legal and political culture of the country. 
A. Serbia’s Historical Background 
Modern day Serbia was not officially born as an independent state until 2006 
when Montenegro declared itself independent. Prior to this, Serbia had been a part 
of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia until 1990, when it adopted a constitution in 
which it formally severed ties with socialist constitutionalism. The Constitution of 
1990 guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms of Serbian citizens.94 It also 
established formal separation of powers and provided for an independent 
judiciary.95 Unfortunately, the Constitution looked better on paper than it did in 
actual practice. These constitutional principles of independence and autonomy of 
the judiciary were never taken further beyond being principles on paper.96 During 
the “Milosevic Era” the Constitution was little more than a common political 
instrument, and judges were pressured into deciding cases in a way that conformed 
to the desires of the executive and legislative authorities.97 The existing ideology of 
the then existing political and state legal system was one that intended and 
understood the judiciary to be dependent and non-autonomous.98 
Serbia was part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which evolved 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from 2003 to 2006.99 When Montenegro 
declared its independence in May 2006, Serbia held a two-day referendum that 
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ratified a new constitution to replace that of the Milosevic Era.100 The new 
constitution of 2006 provides for establishment of the rule of law through “free and 
direct elections, constitutional guarantees of human and minority rights, separation 
of power, independent judiciary and observance of [c]onstitution and [l]aw by the 
authorities.”101 Article 4 specifically establishes separation of powers into three 
branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) and also explicitly provides for 
judicial independence.102 Also in 2006, the Ministry of Justice passed the National 
Judicial Reform Strategy in order to implement strategic reforms of the judicial 
system.103 The main purpose of the strategy was to “[t]o regain the public trust in 
the Republic of Serbia judicial system by establishing the rule of law and legal 
certainty” through a judicial system that is independent, transparent, accountable, 
and efficient.104 Unfortunately, as with the previous constitution and laws of Serbia, 
the new constitution and strategy have suffered from similar deficits of merely 
being words on paper and have faced challenges in actual implementation. Namely, 
the judiciary is still subject to political control and exhibits signs of lacking 
independence in practice. 
B. Structure and Organization of Serbia’s Judiciary 
The judiciary and court system in Serbia has its roots in the emergence of an 
independent constitutional monarchy that emerged in the second half of the 19th 
century after a prolonged period of Ottoman rule.105 Serbia’s legal system and 
judiciary is based on a civil law inquisitorial system and has been influenced by the 
legal traditions of its European neighbors such as Germany, Austria, and France; 
the most significant and enduring influence on Serbia’s judicial system, however, 
has been the legacy of socialist rule in Yugoslavia.106 The court system in Serbia is 
divided into two divisions—the courts of general jurisdiction and specialized 
courts.107 The courts of general jurisdiction include the Basic, High, and Appellate 
Courts and the Supreme Court of Cassation, which is the highest judicial institution 
in the country.108 
Currently, Serbia has a national judicial system headed by the High Judicial 
Council, which is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation.109 The High Judicial Council (HJC) was established as a constitutional 
institute in Articles 153–155 of the Serbian Constitution of 2006.110 The principle 
function of the HJC includes the selection, promotion, and discipline of judges, 
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proposing the judiciary budget, and nominating court presidents who are elected by 
the National Assembly.111 The HJC was established to promote judicial reform and 
the independence of the judiciary; however, it has largely been unsuccessful in 
fulfilling these goals. 
C. Justice Sector Reforms in Serbia 
Since the end of Milosevic’s regime, Serbia has sought to strengthen the 
independence of the judiciary in practice and enhance its role in advancing legal 
and judicial reforms.112  Serbia’s recent commitment to strengthening its rule of law 
and establishing a truly independent judiciary can be linked to its efforts in gaining 
membership to the European Union.113 The judiciary in post-socialist Serbia is 
regulated by a “package of laws on the judiciary,” which was originally adopted in 
2001.114 However, amendments to these laws in 2002 and 2003 shifted leading 
responsibilities to the legislative branches of government.115 This led to a reduction 
in judicial independence with the judiciary in fact becoming more dependent upon 
the government.  However, with the amendment to the package in 2004, the 
judiciary regained some of its former institutional independence.116 In 2008, the 
Parliament approved a new package of laws that introduced substantive changes in 
Serbia’s judicial system.117 This package includes the “Law on Organization of 
Courts, High Judicial Council, State Prosecutorial Council, and Seat and Territorial 
Jurisdiction of Courts and Public Prosecutor’s Offices,” which took effect January 
1, 2010.118 
The Judicial Reform Strategy adopted in 2006 [hereinafter referred to as 2006 
Strategy] is primarily devoted to the reform of Serbia’s court system. It laid out 
fundamental principles regarding the position of the judiciary within the justice 
system. Central to these principles was the need to “guarantee the independence and 
autonomy of the judiciary honoring the principle of the division of power based on 
the checks and balances between the three branches.”119 The 2006 Strategy accused 
the former constitution of being an “unavoidable obstacle on the path to the 
establishment of the rule of law as the supreme value of the constitutional order” 
and stated the need for the new constitution to reflect new legal, political, and 
economic needs.120 The 2006 Strategy put forward the framework for judicial 
reform focusing primarily on four key principles, including judicial independence, 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency spanning from 2006-2013.121 Each 
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principle is further broken down into fundamental reform goals, three of which fall 
under each key principle and are designed specifically to address the challenges 
facing Serbia’s judiciary. 
On July 1, 2013, Serbia adopted a new National Judicial Reform Strategy 
[hereinafter referred to as the “New Strategy”] for the period of 2013-2018.122 This 
came after a failed reform effort launched in 2009.123 The New Strategy is 
conceived as a five-year strategic framework, which sets forth key principles, their 
strategic objectives, and long-term guidelines for achieving the objectives. Where 
the previous 2006 Strategy identified four fundamental principles, the New Strategy 
identifies five key principles, including independence, impartiality, and quality of 
justice, competence, accountability and efficiency.124 The strategy objective 
expands upon that of its predecessor, stating the current objective to include “[t]he 
improvement of the quality and efficiency of justice, strengthening the 
independence and accountability of the judiciary, with the aim of strengthening the 
rule of law, democracy, legal certainty, improving access to justice for citizens and 
restoring trust in the judicial system.”125 
The New Strategy also calls for adoption of an Action Plan for implementation 
of the Strategy. On July 31, 2013, Serbia passed Resolution No. 700-6579/2013 on 
the Adoption of the Action Plan for the National Judicial Reform Strategy for the 
Period 2013-2018.126 Further elaboration of particular measures and activities is 
carried out in the Action Plan, which is to be updated annually, based on an analysis 
of the previously achieved results.127 Specifically, the Action Plan defines 
“strategic guidelines, measures and activities for the implementation of the 
Strategy; the competent authority responsible for implementing the activities; 
deadlines for completion of the activities; and sources of funds.”128 
In addition to the numerous legislative reforms Serbia has taken to strengthen 
its rule of law and judicial independence, there have also been many policy and 
program initiatives by international agencies. In an effort to aid Serbia on its path to 
gaining EU membership, the United States has offered multimillion-dollar funding 
to help establish judicial reform and rule of law programs. The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a five-year $21.8 million 
project in October 2011 to strengthen Serbia’s rule of law and help detect and 
prevent corruption.129 This program––the Judicial Reform and Government 
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Accountability project––initiated by USAID, will support the independence of the 
judiciary, increase public awareness of judicial reforms, and strengthen the ability 
of the Serbian government’s independent agencies and civil society organizations to 
counter corruption.130 Additionally, the Separation of Powers Program, executed by 
the East-West Management Institute (EWMI) under a contract with USAID, has 
been implemented as an international project in Serbia designed to deal with court 
administration reform and court financing.131 
While the above programs are highly important in helping Serbia enhance its 
rule of law initiatives and strengthen its judiciary, the most recent and most 
significant institutional and structural change has come in the adoption of a new 
Criminal Procedure Code. As previously stated, Serbia is based upon a civil law 
inquisitorial model. In September of 2011, Serbia passed a new Criminal Procedure 
Code, which went into effect in early 2013, moving its legal system from an 
inquisitorial model to a more American adversarial model.132 The new CPC 
incorporates adversarial hallmarks such as cross-examination, expanded 
cooperating agreements, prosecutor-led investigations, and the concept of plea-
bargaining.133 
Perhaps most importantly, the new CPC involves changes to the role of judges, 
whereby judges will no longer serve conflicting roles as both investigator and 
arbitrator, but rather they will act only as neutral arbitrators, resolving disputes 
between parties based on evidence presented.134 In doing so, judges are effectively 
removed from the role of inquisitor and restored to the role of arbitrator. The CPC 
that had originally been established in 2001 outlines two investigative stages, police 
investigation and court investigation, with the investigative judge taking the leading 
role in the court investigation phase.135 Additionally, the judge also had the leading 
role at trial, with the authority to examine issues beyond the parties’ motions, which 
would seem contrary to the notion of the impartiality of judges. Prosecutors may 
now conduct investigations against both identified and unknown subjects, while the 
defense may also independently carry out its own investigations.136 In an effort to 
increase efficiency, the new CPC also expands the use of plea-bargaining, the use 
of cooperating witnesses, and summary proceedings. While the new CPC looks 
good on paper, putting it into practice may prove to be more difficult. It is too early 
to effectively evaluate the results from this novel change, however it can be 
anticipated that a great deal of training and education programs will be necessary 
for effective implementation. 
Given that Serbia has adopted a constitution which establishes judicial 
independence and guarantees human rights and minority rights, these legislative 
and policy reform efforts are intended to help implement these constitutionally 
established elements in practice. However, this has been a slow process so far and 
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Serbia continues to face challenges with regard to the independence of the 
judiciary, corruption, and human rights violations adjudicated before the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
D. Evaluating the Legislative Justice Sector Reforms in Serbia 
While Serbia’s Constitution of 2006 includes fundamental principles like the 
rule of law, separation of powers among three branches of government, and judicial 
independence, serious gaps in these areas have been identified, mainly in how they 
actually operate in practice. Although Serbia has made significant strides with 
regard to its justice sector reforms, there are still many challenges and failures that 
are inherent in Serbia’s legal system. Namely, while the Constitution provides for 
an independent judiciary, there are insufficient protections to ensure this is carried 
out in practice. Additionally, the appointment of judges remains politicized, judges 
are still subject to improper outside influence, and judicial salaries remain low, 
thereby producing an environment conducive to corruption.137 According to 
Freedom House Nations in Transit Report for 2014, Serbia’s judiciary continues to 
suffer from inefficiency, political influence, and judicial bias.138 Despite the 
number of substantive legislative and constitutional reforms that have taken place in 
Serbia since 2006, including the adoption of a new Constitution, Serbia’s Judicial 
Framework and Independence Score has remained unchanged at 4.50 since 2008.139 
Moreover, this score actually decreased from 4.25 in 2006 to its current level at 
4.50.140 Thus, while Serbia has no doubt made significant strides in reforming its 
judicial system through the adoption of new legislation, clearly such legislation has 
not yet gone beyond the four corners of the paper on which it is written. That is, 
such legislative reforms have not yet taken hold and seen success in practice. 
The European Commission’s Progress Report of Serbia for 2014 found that the 
constitutional and legislative framework still leaves room for undue political 
influence affecting the independence of the judiciary.141 The report indicated that 
some judges from higher courts were confronted with direct attempts to exert 
political influence over their daily activities.142 It also states that while the 
impartiality of judges is ensured through the constitutional and legal framework, 
implementation in practice has been hindered by not randomly allocating cases, 
providing a scope for circumventing the system.143 The Report suggested 
constitutional amendments that would reform the method of election for HJC 
members along with amendments that would allow for judicial review of dismissal 
decisions in order to “strengthen the independence, representativeness and hence 
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legitimacy of these self-governing bodies.”144 
The new Constitution of 2006 does not regulate grounds for discharge of a 
judge, which results in legislators having a wider margin for prescribing these 
grounds and allows them to be easily changed.145 This could have detrimental 
effects on de facto judicial independence because it would allow legislators to 
eliminate judges that do not conform their decisions to the desires of the national 
legislature. Additionally, the new constitution does not automatically provide for 
permanency of judges upon appointment. Instead, it provides that judges’ first 
appointment to judicial office shall be for a term of three years and then they may 
be “re-elected” by the High Judicial Council for life.146 This is a significant 
problem for ensuring de facto judicial independence. Recall Feld and Voigt’s de 
facto measure, which sets out judicial tenure as an indicator of de facto 
independence. If judges are subjected to re-election after only three years, this 
leaves room for retribution against judges for their decision-making. 
In fact, Judges who were originally appointed to life terms under the 1990 
Constitution were subjected to re-election. During the re-appointment procedure in 
2009, more than 800 judges were not re-appointed.147 However, following a 2012 
Constitutional Court ruling, 500 of the 877 officials who appealed their non-
reappointment were re-instated.148 The reappointment procedure was carried out in 
a non-transparent way, which significantly threatened the independence of the 
judiciary,149 particularly in regard to de facto judicial independence. 
According to the new Judicial Reform Strategy, the reappointment of judges 
and prosecutors in 2009 was conducted by a non-transparent procedure, and the 
judicial network was assessed as unsuitable because of shortcomings in the legal 
framework, which insufficiently guarantees the independence of judges and 
autonomy of public prosecutors.150 The New Strategy also indicates there is a lack 
of transparency in the work of the State Prosecutorial Council and the High Judicial 
Council.151 In addition to the adoption of the New Strategy, which was designed to 
address these shortcomings and challenges, a Strategy Implementation Commission 
led by the Ministry of Justice was established in September 2013.152 This 
Commission was charged with monitoring and measuring progress in the 
implementation of the 2013-2018 national Judicial Reform Strategy and the related 
Action Plan.153 Unfortunately, the commission has not yet been instrumental in 
securing timely and adequate implementation of judicial reform.154 
The newly reformed judiciary has also failed to uphold constitutionally 
established human rights. According to data from the ECHR, in 2009 Serbia was 
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found guilty of human rights violations in 16 cases, the majority of which dealt with 
the court’s failure to protect individual rights and can be traced to the lack of de 
facto independence of the judiciary.155 In 2010, the number of cases dropped to 9; 
2011 saw an increase of 3 cases with a total of 12; but most notably, all of the 
violations were classified under the same categories of human rights violations.156 
These cases included violations of right to a fair trial, right to liberty and security, 
right to effective remedy, protection of property, and the length of proceedings; all 
of which are constitutionally protected. The year of 2014 saw another increase in 
violations with the number rising to 18 cases.157 Again, the majority of judgments 
were either for violation of the right to a fair trial or the violation of the right to an 
effective remedy due to the non-enforcement of domestic judgments.158 The failure 
of the judiciary to protect and uphold these basic human rights established by law in 
Serbia has weakened the rule of law (as these are also common elements used in 
thick, or substantive rule of law definitions) and respect for human rights. 
Serbia has made progressed by adopting further legislation including 
amendments to the law on the organization of courts, the law on judges and the law 
on public prosecution offices, along with creating a new network of courts of 
general jurisdiction that started operating in January 2014.159  Additionally, through 
adoption of the New Strategy and the accompanying Action Plan, Serbia has 
attempted to implement its legislative and constitutional reforms in practice. 
Unfortunately, Serbia has not yet been successful in this. Not only does the 
implementation of these comprehensive reforms to the judicial system and rule of 
law in Serbia require a substantial amount of training and educational programs, but 
it also requires the changing of long held traditional beliefs and attitudes by the 
judiciary as well as the executive and legislative branches regarding the role and 
position of the judiciary in the system. 
As a result, Serbia serves as an example of the fact that while it is possible to 
establish an independent judiciary in the constitution and laws of a country, this 
does not ensure judicial independence in practice. Based on the results obtained 
from the quantitative analysis, it is de facto rather than de jure judicial 
independence that is most important for establishing the rule of law. As such, it is 
unlikely that Serbia will see improvements in the strength of its rule of law, 
including a reduction in human rights violations, until it successfully establishes de 
facto judicial independence. The reason these legislative efforts have failed in 
Serbia is primarily because of the lack of a strong de facto independent judiciary to 
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implement and uphold the new constitutions and legal codes that have been adopted 
pursuant to the rule of law reform efforts. 
IV. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING JUSTICE SECTOR LEGISLATION IN 
TRANSITIONING COUNTRIES 
The results of the quantitative analysis demonstrate that judicial independence, 
particularly de facto judicial independence, is a significant factor in strengthening 
the rule of law. Therefore, this section argues that de facto judicial independence is 
a better indicator of the rule of law than de jure independence. The key to 
establishing judicial independence is not only enshrining judicial independence 
within the content of legal documents such as constitutions and statutes, but also to 
ensure the independence of the judiciary in practice. Furthermore, judicial 
independence is not interchangeable with the rule of law, nor should it be 
considered a component in measuring the rule of law because this results in its 
importance to the rule of law being undermined. Rather, judicial independence must 
be analyzed separately from the rule of law in order to better assess the 
conduciveness of the legal environment and whether it is ready to support 
legislative rule of law reforms. Although de facto judicial independence is but one 
piece of the broader legal environment, it is argued here that it is an essential one. 
Additionally, as the results of the quantitative analysis demonstrate, the type of 
legal system and characteristics of a democratic regime are also key pieces of an 
environment capable of supporting a strong rule of law. 
Constructing an Environment Conducive to Supporting Legislative Rule of 
Law Reforms 
Modern law and development in transitioning countries has generally called for 
enhancing legal systems and democratic political systems by transplanting Western 
legal institutions and codes into these countries.160 Research suggests that such law 
and development efforts have failed because of the lack of an appropriate legal 
culture.161 That is, there are a myriad of factors other than the actual written law 
itself that affect whether the written law will be successful. Brian Tamanaha refers 
to these other factors as the “connectedness of law principle” indicating some of 
these factors to include legal institutions; cultural attitudes toward law; history, 
tradition, and culture of society; the political system; and geo-political surroundings 
(hostile or unstable neighbors).162 The analysis advanced here builds on the 
“connectedness of law principle” advanced by Tamanaha and argues, based upon 
the quantitative results obtained, that a supportive environment for the rule of law 
includes a de facto independent judiciary, a legal system more closely aligned with 
common law, and a political system that is more characteristic of democracy. 
To date, the transplanting of legal codes into transitioning countries has 
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amounted to little more than mere empty words put on paper.163 An emerging 
explanation for these failures has indicated the lack of a supportive legal culture and 
has emphasized the fundamental fact that “context matters.”164 This “context” or 
legal and political culture includes several important factors. First, there must be the 
presence of a constitution that provides the basic structure and rules of the system, 
how the government is to carry out its responsibility, and embody substantive rules 
that authorize and limit governmental powers.165 However, as is often the case, 
governmental actors in practice do not adhere to the constitution. Therefore, more is 
required. The second important factor is an independent judiciary capable of 
judicial review.166 Because judicial institutions are important to the fabric of a legal 
system, a corrupt or dysfunctional judiciary can debilitate an entire legal system.167 
Moreover, the judicial system must include protections that ensure the 
independence and efficiency of the judicial system as a whole in practice.168 As it 
relates to the judiciary and legal culture, Tamanaha describes the “connectedness of 
law principle” in action this way: 
Dysfunctional, oppressive, or unfair legal systems breed popular distrust 
and contempt for the law. This, in turn, contributes to the incapacity of 
the legal system, which further generates fear, avoidance, or disregard for 
the law. The trap can be avoided if courts consistently function over time 
in ways that meet the needs of citizens, but negative cultural attitudes 
toward law and judge are slow to change.169 
A third factor is the characteristics of the political system. Liberal democracies 
tend to be more peaceful in nature and are less likely to go to war with one 
another.170 While the objective of most nation-building efforts is to make violent 
societies more peaceful and not necessarily more democratic, the two typically 
accompany one another, and political reform efforts usually involve some type of 
democratization efforts.171 Fourth is the factor of legal origin or type of legal 
system, a factor that has recently entered the research debate arena.172 It is 
suggested that common law systems tend to produce better quality substantive legal 
outcomes.173 Furthermore, in contrast to the civil law system, the common law 
approach has been upheld as being both transparent and accountable and has 
offered a better opportunity for establishing an independent judiciary, which has 
been viewed as a core element of the rule of law and essential to providing the 
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necessary foundation for economic growth.174 
This Note argues that these four factors, while not exhaustive, are nonetheless 
highly important in creating an environment that is conducive to supporting 
legislative rule of law reform efforts. Consequently, it is contended that legislative 
reforms have failed primarily because of the lack of judicial independence. In 
particular, the lack of de facto judicial independence results in a weakly established 
rule of law, and legislative justice sector reforms do not take hold in this 
environment. Furthermore, such legislative reforms have also failed resulting from  
the lack of a legal and political environment supportive of the rule of law. 
Specifically, political regimes that exhibit democratic characteristics and have legal 
systems more closely aligned with the common law legal tradition result in a 
strengthened rule of law. An environment that embodies the four factors discussed 
above is more conducive for supporting legislative rule of law reform efforts. 
Tamanaha’s “connectedness of law principle” is supported by the results 
obtained from the earlier quantitative analysis. Judicial independence, when tested 
as an overall score, was a statistically significant predictor of the rule of law. 
Furthermore, the argument that de facto judicial independence provides a better 
indicator of the strength of the rule of law was also substantiated. When judicial 
independence was tested as two separate indicators, de facto judicial independence 
was highly significant while de jure judicial independence did not come close to 
being statistically significant. This supports the claim that it is possible to have a 
constitutionally established judiciary, but does not guarantee its independence in 
practice, and also does not help to strengthen the rule of law in practice. 
The results of this analysis also suggest that a system based on the common law 
legal tradition provides a more conducive environment for the rule of law to prevail. 
This is not to say that some level of the rule of law cannot exist in a country that has 
a legal system based on something other than common law or has a mixed legal 
system, but rather that the rule of law will be stronger in countries with a legal 
system based upon common law. Therefore, this tends to support the claim that a 
legal system, which is more closely aligned with the common law legal tradition 
will provide a more supportive legal culture for legislative rule of law reform. 
Although the type of political regime was not statistically significant, it did 
appear to have some effect on the level of the rule of law. Because security 
effectiveness and political legitimacy to some extent represent characteristics of the 
type of political regime in power, the fact that they were statistically significant 
tends to support the notion that countries classified as a democracy are more likely 
to have a strengthened rule of law. Political legitimacy deals with regime/
governance inclusion and includes factors that to some degree measure the 
repressiveness of a regime. A more repressive regime would be characterized as 
one that is based upon authoritarian rather than democratic principles. Security 
effectiveness measured the amount of political violence and armed conflict in a 
country. This too could be characteristic of the type of regime in power since there 
is a large body of research that argues that democratic regimes are less likely to 
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initiate war or use military force than are authoritarian regimes.175 
Thus, if the amount of conflict and repressiveness of the regime are taken as 
indicators of the type of regime that is in power, the negative relationship between 
these variables and the rule of law would then lend support to the fact that the type 
of political regime does affect the level of the rule of law. That is, a country with a 
greater degree of repressiveness and more involvement in armed conflict or 
political violence would be more likely to be characterized as an authoritarian 
regime. As a result, the negative relationship between these two variables and the 
rule of law means that as scores increase in terms of conflict and repressiveness 
(indicative of non-democracy), the strength of the rule of law decreases. Therefore, 
it may be that the type of political regime in power does affect the rule of law but 
that characteristics of a political regime such as amount of conflict (security 
effectiveness) and government inclusion/repressiveness (political legitimacy) are 
better indicators of the strength of the rule of law in a given country. This means 
that a political culture that is more characteristic of a democracy provides an 
environment more receptive and supportive of the rule of law, and legislative 
reforms will be more likely to take hold. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Carothers categorizes rule of law reform into three main categories. 
“Type one” reform focuses on the laws themselves by revising laws and codes; 
“type two” involves strengthening law-related institutions to enhance efficiency and 
accountability; and “type three” concentrates on the government’s compliance with 
the law, a key step being the achievement of “genuine” judicial independence.176 
This Note argues that types one and two will not be successful if a “genuine” or de 
facto independent judiciary is not first established. Based on the results obtained 
from the quantitative analysis and an examination of failed legislative reforms in 
Serbia, this Note concludes that successful legislative rule of law reforms must take 
place within the context of a supportive legal, political, and social environment. 
Legislative efforts to reform the rule of law in transitioning countries cannot be 
successful until the independence of the judiciary is actually ensured in practice. 
Additionally, a more conducive environment in which such reform efforts are more 
likely to take hold is one that is closely aligned with a common law legal system 
and has characteristics of democracy. 
However, it is important to note that although factors such as de facto judicial 
independence, legal system, and political regime characteristics are important to 
constructing a supportive environment, these factors are not exhaustive. It is likely 
more useful to view these factors as necessary, but not sufficient, for establishing an 
environment supportive of legislative rule of law efforts. Challenges still remain as 
to history, tradition, and cultural attitudes of society. For the rule of law to exist, 
people must identify with the law and perceive it to be worthy of ruling the 
populous because it reflects their shared cultural beliefs and values and serves their 
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interests.177 Unfortunately, in many transitioning nations the government is 
distrusted, there are negative views towards the law where legal officials are viewed 
as corrupt and where the law has had a history of enforcing authoritarian rule.178 A 
culture of societal distrust for the legal system presents significant challenges to 
legislative reform efforts. 
Additionally, merely transplanting Western laws, codes, constitutions, and 
ideals also raises challenges. Constitutionalism and democracy mean something 
different in a variety of countries.179 Simply exporting an American system of laws 
and ideals to a country with an entirely different history, tradition, and set of 
cultural beliefs will likely not be the most successful approach and will probably 
lead to more disappointing results. There are obviously features of the American 
system that have proved to be more conducive to supporting a strong rule of law. 
However, the key challenge will be striking a balance between establishing those 
factors that have proven successful and yet allowing them to be adapted to a 
particular legal, social, and political culture. 
Despite the nuanced challenges of moving forward with rule of law 
development legislation, it seems to be clear that prior to a successful legislative 
rule of law reform, a country first needs a supportive environment in place. This 
means that merely going from country to country drafting new laws and 
constitutions will not produce the intended results. Without such a supportive 
environment, the laws are nothing more than empty words worth only the paper 
upon which they are written. 
 
 
 177.  Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 246-47. 
 178.  Tamanaha, supra note 4, at 247. 
 179.  Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 1479. 
